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Abstract 
While the United States has long advocated the spread of democratic 
governance all over the World, democracy promotion in the Arab World did 
not emerge as a central pillar of American foreign policy until the end of the 
twentieth century. As for US aid to the Arab World, billions of Dollars were 
given to some Arab countries during the last few decades to encourage 
economic development and political reform. It was hoped that this aid would 
help transform the area into democracy and economic prosperity. This paper 
explores the impact of the U.S. aid policy on democracy and political reform in 
Jordan and other Arab countries. It advances three arguments: First that the 
impact of US aid has not yet made any significant difference in the nature of 
Arab political affairs. Second, that the Arab World underwent some modest 
structural changes that may lead to significant socio-political developments in 
the long run. Finally, although US aid has had some positive impact on 
democracy and political reform, the socio-political reality of the region is still 
dominated by dictatorships, anti-Americanism, poverty, unemployment, and 
corruption. Good governance and protection for human rights and democracy 
are still distant goals. 
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Executive Summary 
While the United States has long advocated the spread of democratic governance 
all over the World, democracy promotion in the Arab World did not emerge as a central 
pillar of American foreign policy until the end of the twentieth century. As for US aid to 
the Arab World, billions of Dollars were given to some Arab countries during the last 
few decades to encourage economic development and political reform. It was hoped 
that this aid would help transform the area into democracy and economic prosperity. 
This paper explores the impact of the U.S. aid policy on democracy and political reform 
in Jordan and other Arab countries. It advances three arguments: First that the impact 
of US aid has not yet made any significant difference in the nature of Arab political 
affairs. Second, that the Arab World underwent some modest structural changes that 
may lead to significant socio-political developments in the long run. Finally, although 
US aid and policy has indeed some positive effects on democracy and political reform it 
can be argued that dictatorships, anti-Americanism, poverty, unemployment, and 
corruption are still the main features of the socio-political reality of this region until the 
present day; that this region is the least governance, human rights and democracy.  
1 Introduction 
For decades, the United States had ignored any concerns about freedom, human 
rights and political reform in the Arab World, valuing regimes stability for the sake of its 
economic and security interests. Over the course of the last decade, however, the US 
administration has begun changing its policy toward the entire region. This change 
came as a result of September 11 terrorists' attacks which made it clear that these 
policies were in fact breeders of anti-Americanism and extremism. First the American 
adopted a policy of regime change as the case in Afghanistan and Iraq and they face 
problems in both countries they adopted a new policy that calls for democracy and 
political reform in the entire region as a way to fight extremism and terrorism. Economic 
aid was used a practical tool to achieve the goals of this policy and indeed they started 
to provide Jordan and other Arab countries, with millions of Dollars to encourage 
development and political reform. It was hoped that such aid will help transform the 
area into democracy and economic prosperity. Unfortunately, all Arab states reacted 
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negatively to US and other internal and external calls for democracy and consequently, 
dictatorships, anti-Americanism, poverty, unemployment, corruption and terrorism are 
still the main features of the region until the present day. 
1.1 Objectives 
 The main objectives of this study are to increase understanding of the United 
States aid policies to Jordan and other Arab countries and assess their impact on 
democracy and political reform during the last decade; to examine United States level 
of aid funding to Jordan and other Arab countries; to conduct interviews with relevant 
policy makers, regarding future policy that will be followed for the allocation of US aid 
for the MEPI goals and criteria for democracy, and finally to write a research paper and 
20 page policy study with recommendations for relevant policy makers, parliament, 
political parties and other institutions in Jordan, USA and other Arab countries. 
1.2 Study Questions  
The Study tries to find answers to the following questions: What are US policies 
towards political reform in the Arab World before and after 9/11? What are the 
objectives of USAID in general and the Middle East Partnership Initiative in particular 
(MEPI)? Can the United States promote political reform at the expenses of instability 
and cooperation of Arab regimes on the war against terrorism? Can the United States 
risk the emergence of unfriendly Islamists regimes to replace the present ones? Can 
the United States afford the consequences of loosing its military bases and control over 
the oil production and supply in Gulf if it antagonizes Arab regimes by demanding them 
to change into democracy? Is it feasible for the United States to promote political 
reform effectively amid Arabs’ widespread anti-Americanism and grievances against 
the occupation of Iraq and its support to Israel? What are the reactions of Jordanian 
and other Arab regimes to the US efforts to democratize the area? What are the 
specific steps if any that Jordanian government had has taken toward democracy and 
political reform?  
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1.3 Methodology  
To achieve the above objectives and find answers to the previous questions the 
author conducted: extensive literature review about US policy and the size of the 
United States' aid to Jordan and other Arab countries; a survey study regarding the 
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) its goals, programs and funding allocated to 
Jordanian and other Arab countries; interviews with government officials, policy 
makers, leaders of political parties, academics, and experts to understand their 
positions and views regarding the US aid and political reform policy and the region 
reaction to it; interviews with policy makers, experts, academics from, Georgetown 
university, Carnegie foundation, Brooking Institute, George Washington university, 
Washington Institute for near East policy, OSI, International republican Institute, 
International Peace Institute and the State Department. This was done during my stay 
as a visiting scholar at Georgetown University in summer 2005. 
The paper consists of six parts: Part one provides introduction to the subject, its 
objectives and methodology. In part two, it discusses US policy and relations with the 
Arab World before 9/11 and after 9/11. In part three, it discusses US aid to the Arab 
World in general and the Middle East Partnership initiative in particular. In part four, it 
discusses Arab reaction to US aid policy. In Part five: it discusses Arab reaction to US 
reform policy. Part six, conclusions and recommendations.   
2 US Policy for Promoting Democracy in the Arab 
World  
2.1 Background  
America direct contact with the Arab World stared during World War One; 
intensified after War World Two when America became the undisputed leader of the 
Western World. It gradually felled the vacuum created by the departure of the old 
colonial powers, Britain and France, from the Middle East and sense then the 
Americans dominated politics and the oil business in the Middle East.  
However, and until the end of Word War II America was popular in the Arab World 
as it was seen a liberal and non colonial power especially after its opposition to the joint 
British, French and Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956 Alsoudi, 2005. But 
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unfortunately there were several factors that complicated and poisoned the US–Arab 
relations and affected US policy towards the region among them the Arab Israeli 
conflict, The cold war, Iraq-Iran war, the first Gulf war, US bases on in Saudi Arabia 
and other Arab countries, Oil, terrorism and  US occupation of Iraq 
2.1.1 The Arab Israeli-Conflict 
The first and most important factor that has affected US-Arab relation, in negative 
way and still until today, was Washington decision to support the creation of Israel in 
1947, and later its policy of unlimited support for Israel in its conflict with its Arab 
neighbors. America provided Israel with massive economic, political and military 
assistant especially after 1967 war. The annual amount of US economic assistant to 
Israel is about three billion dollars and totaled to about 100 billion Dollars sense the 
creation of Israel in1948 Alsoudi, 2005. It could argue that the Arab-Israeli conflict was 
and still the essence of the pan-Arab cause, and American “support for Israel was too 
massive to allow for healthy relationships with most Arab countries, let alone with Arab 
public opinion Hudson 2005: 287). 
2.1.2 Oil 
The other important factor that affected US policy toward the area is oil, which 
became extremely important to America and the rest of the developed World after 
World War Two. Given the strategic importance of securing the supply of cheep Arab 
oil, “US administrations determined that their main tasks were to exclude Soviet 
influence from the region and prevent any local forces from nationalizing Western oil 
companies, reducing or restriction production, raising prices and overrunning the 
friendly regimes” Hudson, 2005: 287-89).  The importance of oil led the United States 
to increase its military presence in the GCC countries, including permanent navel and 
air bases, and to provide those countries with arms and trained their military forces. 
The Americans’ military presence was seen by the local population as a form of 
domination and a new type of colonialism not different from their predecessors the 
British and the French. 
2.1.3 The Soviet danger 
After World War Two, America considered the Soviets’ threat as a fundamental 
threat to its security and even to its survival. The Americans realized that “the 
entrenchment of Soviet power in that strategic region would bring a decisive shift in the 
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World balance and could disrupt the economy of the free world” Hudson 2005:284). 
They believed that “the triumph of communism in the heart of the Islamic World could 
be the prelude to its triumph through Asia, Africa and Europe” Campbell: 1958:4-5. 
Arguably, from the end of World War II until the early 1990s, “the underlying 
rationale for providing foreign aid was the same as that for all U.S. foreign policy —the 
defeat of communism” Therefore the aim of U.S. aid programs, to Arab countries 
during this period, were designed “to create stability and reduce the attraction to 
communist ideology and to block Soviet diplomatic links and military advances” Tarnoff 
and  Nowels, 2004. Ottaway, summarizes this US policy as follows: “The old concerns 
that guided U.S. policy in the Middle East is well known: security, oil and Israel" .. ,the 
perceived Soviet threat led the United States to be tolerant of autocratic but reliably 
Arab anti-Soviet governments” Ottaway 2005). 
2.1.4 The Iraq-Iran War 
During the Iraq-Iran war America followed a policy of “dual containment”, which 
practically meant keeping the two states fighting each others without any clear winner. 
The reason for the United States and Europe’s assistance to Iraq during its war with 
Iran was to prevent the Iranian revolution from extending its anti-American influence to 
the vulnerable pro-Western GCC countries. They also were pleased that the war 
practically led to the destruction and consequently weakening both unfriendly countries 
Hudson 2005:285). 
2.1.5 The first Gulf War /occupation of Kuwait 
When Iraq occupied Kuwait in 1991 the United States led a collation of more than 
25 countries including Egypt, Syria and many other Arab Gulf States to liberate Kuwait. 
And indeed America started its first direct war against a major Arab country, and 
succeeded in driving the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in a humiliating fashion not only to 
the Iraqi but to entire Arab nations. Many Arabs analysts believe that the United States 
strategic aim was to destroy the Iraqi Armey for the sake of Israel security and not just 
to liberate Kuwait Attwan, 2004).  
So one could argue that until the end of the 1990s there were no American or 
European serious talks about democracy, political reform and freedom in the Arab 
World, and every thing was fine with America and the West as long as they have 
access to cheep Arab oil and no threat to Israel’s security. 
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2.1.6 US military Bases in the GCC countries 
The other important factor that poisoned US Arab relation is its military bases in 
“Jazeerat Alrab” (Arab Peninsula) which includes Saudi Arabia, the GCC states and 
Yemen. During the 1990s the US needed the cooperation of Arab regimes to establish 
military bases to secure oil supply.  Such presence was provocative to Muslims feelings 
and beliefs, as believe that Aljazeera Alarabeyyah (Arab Peninsula) is holly area, and, 
non Muslims are not allowed stay in it. The permission of Arab regimes to American 
forces to use Arab land, to attack and occupy Iraq was seen by the majority of Arab 
people as “Kheyanh” (betrayal) to the Arab nation and understanding this situation may 
help explain the 9/11 attacks . 
2.1.7 American occupation of Iraq 2003 
The Americans’ War and occupation of Iraq and before it the severe economic 
sanctions that last about ten years caused the death of thousands of Iraqi innocent 
civilians, men, women and children. The suffering of the Iraqi people was broadcasted 
in all Arab television satellite channels, watched by million of powerless Arab masses 
from the Morocco to Oman. Moreover America cooperated with many of authoritarian 
Arab regimes in Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries during the first 
war against Iraq in 1991 the same regimes they trying to change now. These 
developments strengthened anti-Americanisms through out the Arab and Islamic 
Worlds in particular and among the majority of the world nations in general Alsoudi 
2005.  
2.2 US policy before 9/11 
As regarding economic aid, the Arab World was not an important focus of American 
until the early 1970s. Before that America was interested primarily in access to oil, 
stabilizing its friendly Arab oil producing countries, and the security of Israel. In the 
1980s, military and strategic cooperation became increasingly important between 
America, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and the GCC countries. The aim of the new 
cooperation was to protect access to cheep oil supplies, to establish US military bases 
in the region and to facilitate U.S. military operations in Asia and Africa. The US 
administration used economic aid to foster its relations with some of those Arab 
countries and later to encourage them for taken some steps for democracy and political 
reform. They typically direct such aid at one or more of the following institutions or 
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political processes: elections, political parties, constitutions, judiciaries, legislatures, 
local government, NGOs, civic education, trade unions and media organizations. 
The enormous growth of aid in the 1970s and 1980s was directly linked to the 
increasing importance of the region in the Cold War. In the 1970s, the US 
administration succeeded to pull Egypt out of the Soviet camp by sponsoring a peace 
agreement between Egypt and Israel. Sense then US aid played an essential role to 
achieve and maintain the peace treaty and stability in the region. Israel and later Egypt 
have been the largest recipients of American foreign assistance with about 3 billion 
dollars annual assistant to Israel and 2 billion to Egypt Ruttan, 1996:  279.  
In the 1980s, the United States aid policy focused increasingly on economic growth 
as a crucial component to maintain stability in the region. Among US initiatives were 
the U.S.–Egypt Partnership for Economic Growth in 1994, the U.S.–North Africa 
Economic Partnership (USNAEP) in 1998, and Free Trade Agreement with Jordan, the 
Palestinian Authority, and Israel to establish the joint Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) 
1996 USAID, 2005). 
Promoting democracy and political reform in the Arab World was not on the US 
foreign policy agenda until 2002, mainly because of the serious security problems that 
faced its forces in Iraq. Before that many U.S. experts and policy makers believed that 
political reform in the region should be gradual and controlled entirely by the ruling 
regimes and by moderate elements of their allies Carothers, 1999.  However, by the 
end of the 1900s, the US administration realized that economic reform did not lead to 
political reform; that lack of political reform was impeding progress on economic reform 
and more importantly breeding terrorism Levin, 2003. 
2.3 US Policy after 9/11 
The traditional US policy of remote domination of many Arab countries and the 
noninterference in their internal affairs, especially regarding freedom, human rights and 
democracy has changed dramatically after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  
Arab world’s democracy deficit suddenly became the focus of wide discussion 
among US policy circles and media. Many US commentators and experts blamed the 
spread of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the rise of militant Islamic 
fundamentalist movements on political repression and economic stagnation in Arab 
World. Neoconservative analysts in particular criticized autocratic Arab governments, 
including close U.S. allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for spawning radical groups 
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and stifling moderates and appealed to the Bush administration to make the 
democratic transformation of the Middle East a cornerstone of the war on terrorism 
Hawthorne, 2004.  
The American administration accepted this analysis of the roots of terrorism. It 
responded to the question raised by President Bush “why do they hate us?” by putting 
the responsibility on Arab regimes rather than on the United States. They denies that 
animosity toward the United States stemmed at least in part from US policies in the 
Middle East, and refused the notion that the United States' policy towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict had contributed to the rise of terrorism and should reconsider its policies 
Alsoudi, 2005. "Democracy promotion in the Middle East thus became for the first time 
an important professed tenet of the United States’ Middle East policy" Hawthorne, 
2004. 
New assistance programs include the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), 
launched in December 2002; the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, 
formally unveiled at the June 2004 Group of Eight industrialized nations (G-8) summit 
at Sea Island, Georgia.  
Bush in a speech at the National Endowment for Democracy, on November /6/ 
2003, said: "Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of 
freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe - because in the long run, 
stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty."  He added therefore, “the 
United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle 
East.  
This new policy is in contradiction to America's longtime rationale for supporting 
Arab regimes as strategy to guarantee their stability and securing cheep oil supplies. 
The US administration realized after 9/11 that the stability of these regimes was 
deceptive and that the price for maintaining such policy was so high and unaffordable 
Wittes, 2004. 
The new US foreign policy rested on the belief that America should aggressively go 
abroad and forcibly destroy or change hostile regime, especially those who may assist 
or harbor terrorists. That was the logic behind US decision to invade and occupy both 
Afghanistan and Iraq. “There’s no question but what it is going to be cheaper and less 
costly to do it now than it will be to wait a year or two years or three years until they 
developed even more deadly weapons, perhaps nuclear weapons"  Daalder and  
Lindsay 2003.  
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Although Washington’s newfound interest in Middle East democracy may be real, 
"the United States continues to have strong economic and security interests that point 
to a need for close ties with many of the region’s autocratic regimes" Carothers:  2005.  
The US administration does not consider Arab regimes, except Syria, as hostile 
regimes deserve to be changed and has no policy goals to change them. Rather it 
considers them friendly regimes and adopts a policy of providing them with technical 
and economic assistance, to help them stay in power. It is a policy of friendship and 
close cooperation; a policy of economic assistance, political patronage, military 
protection against any internal or external threats. 
It is a policy of mutual benefits between the US administration and Arab regimes 
based on the following: the US continues to support and protect Arab regimes in return 
for securing American interests. Arab public opinion understands this policy, hated it 
and this was and still one of the main reasons for Anti-Americanism, Islamic extremism 
and terrorism. Arab public opinion sees clear alliance between US administration, 
Israel and Arab regimes against them. They see on their screen daily oppression, 
humiliation, killing on the hands of Israeli on Palestinian territories, the Americans on 
Iraq and Arab regimes in every Arab country Alsoudi, 2005) 
 US policy towards the Arab world is practically helping the oppressive regimes 
against their people, and this is exactly one of the causes of extremism and terrorism 
against America. This is the answer for President Bush why the hate us? 
What is required here is a new US policy to support democracy, and political reform 
in the Arab World, a policy of alliance between America and the Arab people to get red 
of oppression and stop its alliance and support to such corrupted failed regimes.  
What the Arab World needs from the United States, in my view, is a clear policy 
declaring that authoritarianism is not acceptable in the World in general and in Arab 
World in particular, and to use all available means to replace it with democratic 
governments. What is required is a policy of alliance between the United States and 
the Arab people to replace the present US policy of protecting and supporting Israel 
and the same regimes that oppress them.  
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3 US Aid Policy to the Arab World 
3.1 Background 
For the past 25 years, the United States has provided Jordan Egypt and other Arab 
countries with billion of Dollars as economic assistance. Overall, assistance has 
evolved through four overlapping phases. The first phase (mid-1970s to early 1980s) 
focused on improving Arab countries' physical infrastructure. The second phase 
(1980s) shifted the primary focus to economic development, education, health, water 
and family planning. Phase three (1990s) focused on environment and economic 
reforms. Phase four began 0n 2002 and continues focused on economic growth, and 
political reform and development. The total USAID assistance to Egypt reached $24.3 
billion dollars and about 4.1 billion dollars to Jordan USAID. http://www.usaid-
eg.org/detail.asp?id=47 
3.2. The Middle East Partnership Initiative MEPI 
On December 12, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the creation of 
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) Powell, 2002). The (MEPI) is a program 
designed to promote political, economic, and educational development in the Middle. It 
has received an estimated $284 million in funding since its creation in 2002. Sharp, 
2005. 
 MEPI’s objectives are divided into four overarching categories: political reform, 
economic reform, educational reform, and women’s empowerment. In order to secure 
Arab cooperation with MEPI, U.S. officials have stressed that MEPI is a “partnership” 
with the Arab world and not an attempt to impose Western values on the region. MEPI 
came as an attempt to find a middle ground, where the United States can encourage 
reforms without challenging the legitimacy of the host Arab government. 
Some analysts believe that the MEPI can have a positive impact on the region by 
promoting democracy and economic development. Others suggest that MEPI will have 
little effect in both encouraging political change and countering anti-Americanism in the 
region. Observers note that MEPI’s underlining strategy of funding small-scale projects 
has proven ineffective in the past when faced with the challenge of reforming closed 
economies and entrenched state bureaucracies Wittes 2004. Other skeptics even 
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suggest that MEPI will only encourage opponents of U.S. policy in the region, who may 
perceive the program as an exercise in U.S. imperialism or an imposition of democracy 
from the west. Some critics of U.S. policy assert that there is an inherent contradiction 
in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, in which the United States advocates 
liberalization in the region, while bolstering ties with autocratic regimes with similar 
strategic interests. Others suggest that no amount of public diplomacy can overcome 
the Arab perception that the United States is too closely aligned with IsraelSharp, 2005 
3.2.1 MEPI funding and programs 
MEPI has received about 282 million dollars sense 2002.Since then the State 
Department has organized over 50 programs, some of which are already operating, 
under each of its four main pillars. MEPI programs can either operate in one or two 
countries or cover the entire Middle East region. Morocco is one of the biggest 
beneficiaries of MEPI, together with Jordan, and Yemen. Many of MEPI’s host 
countries have taken some steps to create quasi-democratic institutions such as 
parliaments, or have allowed some political opposition parties to organize and run in 
elections. However, MEPI has a small presence in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other GCC 
countries where the authorities are more sensitive to reform-minded initiatives Sharp, 
2005. 
In the political arena, MEPI has funded voter registration programs in Yemen, 
judicial reform seminars in Jordan, Oman and Bahrain, and training sessions for female 
candidates for parliament in Morocco and Jordan. In the economic sphere, the program 
has funded commercial law initiatives, debt reform, and the development of information 
technology infrastructures in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.  
4 Arab responses to US aid Policy 
4.1 Arab Perception of Democracy and Political Reform 
Although a consensus is forming within the Arab World’s political elite that 
democracy and political reform is necessary, there is no corresponding agreement on 
what democracy and political reform means. Instead, democracy and reform have 
become a widely used terms with different meaning and perspectives. There are 
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however, three main perspectives dominating the Arab thought today these are: 
Hawthorne, 2004). 
The first perspective is the modernization approach which is advocated by many 
Arab regimes. It calls for gradual reform, but without changing the present power 
sharing structure. 
It rejects the US administration and the Western call for real reform that would 
change the character of power distribution including the submission of the regimes to 
the will of their people.  The Arab League’s June 2003 reform initiative and its May 
2004 declaration on reform, both capture the essence of the modernization perspective 
Arab business council, declaration, 2004). 
The second perspective is the one held by Islamists. They call for political reform on 
the hope that democratic election would enable them to win the elections in most Arab 
countries. Their ultimate goal is to create an authentic Islamic political systems 
governed by Sharia’ law, not Western-style democracies ruled by secular laws. 
Brotherhood manifesto 2003). 
The Third perspective is the liberal democratic outlook, which defines democracy as 
the process needed to establish Western-style democratic institutions, presidency or 
constitutional monarchies. The Alexandria declaration issued in March 2004 by a group 
of Arab intellectuals, former diplomats, and businessmen reflects to a certain degree of 
the liberal perspective Alexandria declaration, 2004).  
4.2 Arab Reaction to MEPI 
The Middle East Partnership Initiative has received mixed reactions, varying from 
country to country in the Arab world. At the governmental level, MEPI has been largely 
welcomed by the Arab monarchies of Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar and Yemen. 
However, even among these enthusiastic Arab countries, there is still a high degree of 
sensitivity toward western programs designed to promote what is perceived as western-
style democracy. The governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Oman have been more 
tepid in their response to MEPI, while the United Arab Emirates has shown less interest 
than some of the other small Gulf monarchies Sharp, 2005 
At the unofficial level, the initial reaction in the Arab world to MEPI was largely 
negative, primarily in the Arab press. Jihad al-Khazin wrote that “there is an insult here, 
which I do not believe Powell intends. This sum [$29 million] means that only 10 cents 
will be spent on every Arab man, woman, and child to teach them democracy” al-
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Khazin, 2002. Joseph Samahah wrote the purpose of MEPI was to link “the ambitions 
of some people in the Arab world to the objectives of the United States, not the 
objectives of the United States to the ambitions of people in the Arab world.” Samahah 
2003. Mustapha Al-sayyed argues that US aid is not only ineffective but that some part 
of the Arab public do not see that aid as a sign of US commitment to promote 
democracy: rather they look at it as instrument for furthering US foreign policy goals” 
Al-sayyed, 2000: 4). According to one recent evaluation by the Brookings Institution, 
“MEPI tends to fund programs carried out by American NGOs that do not cross the red 
lines of regime-sponsored reform, or that simply do not match the political realities 
Arabs face” Wittes 2004. In addition, MEPI’s economic and social programs are 
designed to foster modernization, reform, and development over the long term. 
Moreover, there is no agreement among the different branches of the US 
administration on the issue of democratizing the Arab World. The neoconservatives 
and the hawks in the Department of Defense for example are skeptical about the 
wisdom of democratizing the Arab World. Such tensions do not always help the 
promotion of democracy in the region Ottaway: 2005. 
Add to this the administration's worry that assertive democracy-promotion in the 
Arab world will exacerbate tensions with Arab regimes whose cooperation on other 
issues is highly valued in the State Department and the Pentagon. There are many 
Arab regimes America has supported for years, and whose cooperation is necessary to 
US security, economic interests, and the war on terrorism. In the past, the U.S. 
government has subordinated its concerns about democracy and human rights to 
cooperation against the Soviet Union and the security of Israel Ottaway.2005). 
Many US experts and academics argue that the US has no power or it is not in a 
position to press Arab regimes for political reform. Others including myself believe the 
America has political, economic and military power to push Arab regimes for 
democracy and political reform if it wants to. It is well known that the stability or even 
the survival of many of those Arab regimes depends on America’s political and military 
patronage or economic assistance Alsoudi 2005. In fact the US administration has no 
desire to push Arab regime for reform because such a thing is against its own interests. 
Indeed such policy has great consequences for US military bases, cheep oil supplies, 
Israel security, terrorism and other US geo-strategic interests (Alsoudi 2005) 
Arab regimes are very fragile and manage to continue their rule with the use of 
naked military power and violence. They are hated regimes with no much legitimacy. 
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Therefore I believe that real pressure from America and Europe and clear position 
against oppression and authoritarianism will be more than enough for those regimes to 
start a real democratization process. A UN resolution prohibits oppression and 
dictatorship will be the ideal step in this direction. Uncovering the secret accounts of 
billion of dollars in Europe and the United states owned by Arab rulers, ruling classes 
and officials will help US image and credibility among Arab public opinion. Such policy 
does not serve the Arab people alone rather it serves the interests of America, the 
peace in the region and stability. It is the only policy to severe the cause of freedom 
and democracy in the region for securing a friendly relation between America and the 
Arab people. 
Controlled liberalization that creates nominal-democratic institutions with no real 
power is not democratization. Elections are important, but they are not democracy, the 
existence of weak political parties is not pluralism, women controlled voting is not free 
participation, parliaments without proper authorities, constitutions without implantation 
are not institutions.  
The Arab World today according to Ottaway (2000 p. 21) is the only region of the 
globe in which democracy deemed extremely weak and impossible to develop in the 
near future. She argues that the large amount of US money “are never spent in the 
recipient country but paid to expatriate consultants, administrative overhead and that 
the data is often imprecise or incomplete” (P33). The study concluded that “civil society 
assistance has not been decisive for democratization in Palestine or in Egypt, nor it is 
likely to become a force in the foreseeable future” (p. 44). The study showed civil 
society assistance to Egypt was about 1 percent of the total US 2.3 billion aids to Egypt 
(p.33).  
5 US reform policy and Arab Reaction to it 
 Despite mistrust of the Americans, many government officials and other members 
of the elite have basically accepted the message that Arab countries need positive 
political, economic, and social change. Thus, as U.S. rhetoric on democracy became 
more prominent in 2003 and 2004, domestic opponents of Arab regimes coupled their 
criticisms of U.S. policy with calls for reform. Some Arabs who had privately supported 
democratic reform but had hesitated to voice their opinions publicly were also 
emboldened to weigh in. For their part, Arab rulers, suddenly no longer able to depend 
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on the protection offered by U.S. silence about their poor governance and human rights 
records, found it difficult to reject such criticism outright as they had long done 
Hawthorne, 2004.  
Indeed sense the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; the question of Arab 
reform has become a dominant theme of discussion in the Arab World itself. Arab 
satellite television stations broadcast talk shows featuring vigorous discussions about 
the persistence of authoritarian rule in Arab countries and the incompetence of 
incumbent regimes. The opinion pages of Arab newspapers are full of articles 
championing democratic reform as the only way to strengthen the region against 
Western control. Civil society groups, political parties, and even business organizations 
are promulgating reform manifestos with increasing regularity. Even Jordan Egypt 
Qatar Algeria and other Arab governments have acknowledged the need for reform in 
principle and have announced their own reform initiatives. Some of them introduced 
new legislations; new election and press laws; hold regular parliamentary and 
presidential elections.   
Thus, as U.S. rhetoric on democracy became more prominent in 2003 and 2004, 
opposition groups, academics, parliamentarians  through out the Arab World, held 
conferences, wrote articles, TV interviews, panel discussions, establishing associations 
for democracy, human rights, and even organized demonstration demanding 
democratizing the entire region.  
Some Arab activists who had privately supported democratic reform but had afraid 
to voice their opinions publicly were also encouraged to express their views in public. 
Most Arab rulers declared that they want to advance democracy but in a gradual 
manner and in a way that fits with Arab culture and conditions. They were no longer 
able to depend on U.S. silence about their oppression of their people. 
Arab civil society groups and opposition parties also started to put forward their own 
reform initiatives in 2003 and 2004 as mentioned earlier in Alexandria, Yemen, Beirut 
and Amman. They too sought to seize the reform agenda from the United States to 
counter neoconservative suggestions that the Middle East was a passive region needs 
to be reformed by US intervention. 
Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim, argues that the prospects for liberal 
democracy in the Arab World have never been so bright  Ibrahim, 2004 Fareed Zakaria 
concluded after a visit to the region that “everywhere in the Arab world, people are 
talking about reform” Zakaria, 2004. President Bush acknowledged the demand for 
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reform in the Arab World as he declared in a June 2004 speech that: “voices in that 
region are increasingly demanding reform and democratic change. He added that "For 
decades, free nations tolerated oppression in the Middle East for the sake of stability. 
In practice, this approach brought little stability, and much oppression. So I have 
changed this policy". 
However, such enthusiasm about the inevitability of democratic change in the Arab 
World is premature. So far, talk about reform exceeds actual reform implemented, and 
the reforms that Arab governments have actually carried out in the past decade are 
quite modest and do not affect their fundamentally authoritarian character. 
Furthermore, there is no popular movement for democratic change in the Arab world, 
only a growing willingness among some members of the elite to question existing 
systems and deliberate future options Hawthorne, 2004. 
Nonetheless, the context for reform varies considerably from one Arab country to 
another. But the ferment is real and should not be dismissed as inconsequential. Calls 
for reform have surged and receded, however, without altering the core of authoritarian 
rule. Governments often have used promises of reform as a smokescreen for inaction. 
Hawthorne, 2004. Practically until today, the Arab world remained the least free and 
democratic region of the world, according to the annual surveys of the Freedom House 
and UNDP Arab development reports Freedom House,  2004. 
The reform ferment of the post–September 11 period represents an evolution of this 
earlier liberalizing trend, rather than a wholly new stage in Arab politics. Three 
characteristics mark the present reform environment. First, political reform has become 
a topic of public concern through out the Arab World. Arab Advocates of democracy 
started to speak out for democracy at almost every meeting, conference and workshop 
inside and outside the region. Almost every Arab government has committed itself in 
theory to the concept of reform, and the issue has forced itself onto the agenda of last 
two Arab League summits. Second, Liberal democrats, Islamists and leftists are openly 
raising previously prohibited issues such as putting term limits for Arab rulers, 
transparency, fighting corruption and lifting emergency laws. Third, official voices 
challenging the very need for reform are becoming somewhat fainter Hawthorne, 2004.  
However, the current debate revolves more around what reforms are needed or 
necessary rather than how such reform could be implemented.   
The US democracy initiative, in the beginning at least, enhanced many Arab 
regimes’ desire to show themselves to their people and more importantly to the outside 
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world that they are reformers. They sought to demonstrate that they support US call for 
democracy in principle and that they are taking steps in this directions. Indeed some 
Arab regimes introduced new laws, constitutions, allowed the establishment of 
societies, political parties conducted elections, all this to avoid being targets of future 
U.S. interventions or occupations in the name of democracy and human rights Alsoudi, 
2003. 
However, Arab regimes strategy for reform which is based on the principle of 
gradual and top-down controlled liberalization has worked perfectly and kept them in 
power for the last four decades. This strategy practically prevented any political force to 
emerge, beyond the ruling elites and the Islamist opposition. They maintain total 
control, and the Islamists remain the main opposition. This situation was and still 
convenient to the regimes own survival and in their dealing with American quest for 
democracy Hawthorne, 2004. 
Furthermore, reforms have been introduced from the top, by governments acting on 
their own initiative rather than in response to specific demands from their citizens. 
Some governments such as in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, have 
organized national dialogues, conferences, workshops on reform, but participants and 
topics discussed at such gatherings are tightly controlled and supervised by these 
governments. They are primarily public relations exercises and opportunities for 
carefully selected members of the elite to show the outside World that they are 
reforming. Attempts by opposition groups to demand their governments for democracy 
have met with arrest of those involved in such activities. Indeed, most Arab 
governments have made general statements in support of reform but have not yet 
implemented any significant measures.  
Arab governments understood US conflicting interests, and difficulties therefore 
they rejected US demand and argued that democracy cannot imported or imposed 
from outside; that they know about their conditions and circumstance more than 
Americans do Musa, 2004. 
Some of them even, tightened their controls over their people; others reversed 
some of their previous liberal steps on the name of fighting terrorism. They are 
confident that the Americans wouldn’t ask them to reform and at the same time request 
their cooperation in fighting terrorism. 
Unfortunately, US occupation of Iraq has influenced the reform environment in a 
negative way. Widespread anger over the US occupation of Iraq and over some Arab 
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governments’ direct or in direct support for that occupation exposed America to new 
charges of colonialism and Arab the governments of betrayal or incompetence. 
Numerous demonstrations spread through out the Arab World but most of them were 
by the sheer of military force. Further more, Many Arabs in fact questioned the United 
States' intentions and commitment to promoting democracy in the region, arguing that 
its policies are inconsistent and even hypocritical Alsoudi, 2005.  
Many Arab analysts used US failure to bring democracy or stability to Iraq as an 
indicator to its ignorance in Middle East Affairs. They started to question Americans’ 
real aims in the area, and accused it of becoming yet another colonial power trying to 
secure its interests through full control over Arab oil Wittes: 2004)  
U.S. discussions about the need for democracy in the Middle East have triggered a 
strong negative reaction by Arab commentators and journalists, including in 
discussions of democracy in the Arab press. Arab commentators have treated 
democracy as a foreign policy issue, asking why the United States is suddenly 
discussing democracy in the Arab world and what true intentions it is trying to hide 
behind the smoke screen of democracy talk Ottaway, 2003. 
Arab governments and publics have reacted negatively to US reform policy. They 
have reacted with suspicion to Washington’s attempt to recast itself as a champion of 
democracy and as the friend of all Arab reformers. Such hostility is hardly a surprise 
given the unfriendliness of the environment into which the Bush administration was 
attempting to project its democracy message. Long-standing Arab suspicion of U.S. 
motives in the region was only exacerbated by the administration’s unconditional 
support for Israel and later the occupation of Iraq on false ground Hawthorne, 2004.  
The many contentions that the United States lacks credibility as a promoter of 
democracy in the Middle East revolve around two major themes. First, is the contention 
that the U.S. administration has no credibility when it calls for respect for democracy 
and human rights because of its disregard for the rights of Palestinians, Iraqis, Syrians 
and other Arabs. “The United States cannot claim today to be the champion of 
freedoms while it is waging ‘vicious’ wars against the Arabs in most of their countries, 
from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, and from Iraq to Yemen. . . . This superpower, which 
protects and sponsors Sharon’s mass killings and systematic destruction of Palestinian 
life, cannot emerge as an ‘angel’ in region, calling for democracy!” Salman, 2002. A 
Jordanian commentator asked rhetorically: “And what does Bush have to say about the 
so-called Israeli democracy, which has produced the worst kind of far-right, extremist 
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government, led by General Ariel Sharon, who is committed to continued occupation, 
the demolition of more Palestinian houses, the expropriation of Palestinian land, the 
assassination of Palestinian activists, ethnic cleansing and all-out state terrorism?” 
Fanek, 2002. The second factor Arab commentators cite as undermining U.S. 
credibility is the long-standing U.S. support for autocratic Arab regimes that are willing 
to accept U.S. policies in the area, maintain the status quo, and supply the United 
States with cheap oil. “The US is not the country that people of this region can rely 
upon to generate a foreign climate conducive to fostering and supporting a true 
process of democratization. The US has a long record of supporting dictatorships and 
of plotting to overthrow democratically elected governments. Whenever the defense of 
democratic values has come into conflict with the defense of US interests, the latter 
always win out.” Nafaa,  2002).  
Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa said in an exclusive interview with 
Aljazeera, that the GMEI is lacking a lot of logic in its premises. “I do not think there is 
any logic in piling up Morocco and Bangladesh in a vision of that sort," he added "It is 
illogical to speak of an initiative which requires the cooperation of the Arab states 
without consulting those very states on the nature and details of such ideas. "It is 
unacceptable to attempt to dictate to peoples the developmental paths they should 
take. So, in short, I think this sort of initiative won’t fly the way it was launched and 
promoted" Musa, 2004. 
However, despite mistrust of US efforts toward reform, many Arab officials and 
other members of the liberal elite have basically accepted the message that Arab 
countries need positive political, economic, and social reform. Most Arab states admit 
their socio-economic failures, and seek to reform in ways that improve governments 
and economic performance but without changing the distribution of political power. And 
some of them, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Qatar, Bahrain, have placed some power in the 
hands of their peoples through constitutional and electoral reforms, but the majority 
tries to create false impression that they are moving forward on the road to democracy 
but practically strengthening their grip on political power.   
It is save to say that the issue of political reform has so far generated far more 
debate than actual democratizing change in the Arab world. The main reason is that 
reform is still closely controlled by the authoritarian regimes. They took some cosmetic 
changes to show the outside World that they are taking certain steps toward 
democracy in a way that is suitable to the needs and circumstances of their people. 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2005/06 
 23 
And sense they do not feel that they are under immediate domestic pressure to 
introduce far-reaching reforms; they will continue on the path of authoritarianism 
Ottaway, 2004.  
Whether the reform process will remain largely in the sphere of discourse, or lead to 
real change, depends on numerous factors. One is the capacity of liberal reformers to 
attract the popular support they are now lacking, by developing an appealing socio-
political agenda to accompany their abstract political demands. 
Another is the ability of liberals and Islamists to forge strong alliances able to 
challenge the present regimes. A third factor is the future trajectory of the war on 
terrorism and the outcome of the situations in Iraq and Palestine. All are currently 
fueling anti-American sentiment that complicates the US reform agenda in the region 
Hawthorne, 2004.  
Finally, the willingness of the United States and other Western countries to press for 
democratization, rather than to accept modernizing measures as a sign of democratic 
progress, will help determine the long-term significance of the current reform efforts 
Ottaway 2004.  
6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusion 
For decades, the United States has advocated the spread of democratic 
governance overseas but it had ignored any concerns about democracy in the Arab 
World, valuing stability for the sake of US economic and security interests. Indeed US 
democratization efforts in the Arab world have traditionally been modest, undertaken in 
consultation with Arab regimes, and aimed at liberalizing the economy rather than 
changing the distribution of political power. They practically supported many Arab 
regimes' own survival strategy of limited liberalization for more than three decades. The 
aim of such policy was to avoid the risk of destabilizing the region; the spread of Soviet 
influence and the establishment of hostile Islamists governments. For the most part, 
US policy towards the Arab World has been driven both by the strategic concerns of 
the Cold War and by domestic politics, the peace process and oil supply. As a result, 
US policy has been designed to provide some Arab regimes with economic aid, others 
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with military assistance and protection to maintain a sufficiently stable region and to 
guarantee flow of oil to US and world-wide. 
During the 1990s, US democracy promotion focused primarily on support for free 
elections, support for the rule of law, human rights, freedoms of expression and 
assembly. The United States has provided funding, training, and other services to a 
broad range of NGOs, including human rights organizations, business leaders, student 
groups, as well as political parties and media. 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks led to a shift in US policy regarding 
democracy and political reform in the entire region. Since then the Bush administration 
started to talk about the need for political change and democracy promotion in the 
region became at the heart of US Middle East policy. In response to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, the hard-line neo-conservatives succeeded to implement some revolutionary 
changes in US-Middle East policy, focusing on the use of pre-emptive war against 
targets identified as threatening to US interests and security. It was this change in 
course that led the US into war and occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq, which elicited 
Arab anger and anti-American sentiment and extremism. 
The most significant tool for promoting democracy is economic aid which was 
specifically designed to foster development in the Arab World in general and Jordan in 
particular. US direct such aid at one or more institutions or political processes such as: 
economic development, parliamentary elections, political parties, governments' budget, 
education systems, women and media organizations. In December 2002, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell announced the establishment of the US-Middle East Partnership 
Initiative (MEPI), to promote economic, political and educational reform in the region. 
Sense then the United States provided Jordan and other Arab countries with million of 
dollars through USAID programs and under the MEPI. Other Arab countries received 
economic aid to encourage development and political reform.  However, the 
effectiveness of US Aid policy results are not promising if there are any results at all. In 
its first few years the Middle East Partnership Initiative allocated about (284) millions to 
be spent on four main programs, governance, education, economic development and 
women empowerment, with less than 5 percent on political reform, and to be spent 
within the approved ceiling set out by Arab regimes. 
Moreover, there is a widespread perception in the Arab World that the Bush 
administration is embracing the cause of democracy promotion not out of sincere 
commitment, but because doing so provides a convenient justification for US 
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occupation of Iraq, its unconditional support of Arab regimes and Israel. Such 
perception feeds a widespread feeling that the U.S. government cannot be trusted thus 
undermining its credibility as an advocate of democracy and political reform in the 
region. 
The issue of political reform has so far generated far more debate than actual 
democratizing change in the Arab world. The main reason is that the US administration 
is not serious or not willing to push for it, and more importantly, Arab regimes are still in 
total control of the political process refusing so far to share power with their people. 
The United States lacks credibility as a pro-democratic actor because of its long-
standing support for Israel and some Arab autocratic regimes, its military basis in some 
Arab countries and more importantly the occupation of Iraq. Second, there is the 
stubborn fact that the friendly Arab autocrats serve significant American economic and 
security interests, and it is not clear that more democratic successor regimes would be 
as helpful to the United States. Hams victory in the last Palestinian election 2006 is a 
good example of democratization in the Arab World. The US administration announced 
that it will not deal with any Palestinian government led by Hamas and stopped its 
future aid to the Palestinian Authority.    
Most Arab states reacted negatively to US call for democracy and consequently, 
dictatorships, anti-Americanism, poverty, unemployment, corruption and terrorism are 
still the main features of the region until the present day. A crosscutting theme among 
Arab public opinion is the rejection of or suspicious attitude toward the role of the US in 
promoting democracy in the Arab World. They see America as assisting their internal 
and external enemies.  
Finally US policies regarding democratization in the Arab world have ranged from 
failure to take action in support of democratization; that the US economic aid is too little 
to make any difference in the reality of oppression in the Arab World. 
6.2 Recommendation 
The United States should try to press for democracy and political reform in the Arab 
World, using its economic, political and moral power and should not wait, under any 
pretext, the change to come from Arab regimes as such thing would not happen in the 
foreseeable future. 
The US should concentrate in the policy dialogue and in programs on issues that 
Arabs reformers have identified as critical: lifting emergency laws, revising laws on 
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forming political parties and regulating NGOs, forming monitoring bodies, and 
amending constitutions to provide for direct election of presidents, term limits, and 
redistribution of power. 
The U.S. Administration should become more alert to whether Arab regimes are 
supporting or undermining local efforts at political and economic reform and make this 
an important factor in their talks and assistance for those regimes. It should make 
reform and democratization a persistent issue in their bilateral talks with Arab leaders. 
The U.S. administration should press for free elections, and devise policy options 
that exploit future opportunities for democracy and political reform when they occur. 
The United States should strongly urge Arab governments to ensure that elections are 
free and fair and to allow international observers monitor the process. They should 
urge Arab governments to allow liberal parties to develop and give them a chance to 
participate in the political process. It is not enough for the United States to call for 
democracy and political reform without taking into consideration that such process 
would bring to power extreme Islamist parties such as Hams, Hizb Allah and other 
Islamist groups. This is a dangerous outcome not only for America but for the Arab 
World too. It is well known that those organizations had built their popularities on 
slogans such as: Islam is the solution; America and the West are the true enemies of 
the Arabs; they are colonizers; crusaders; who created Israel and supported it to defeat 
and humiliate the Arabs and helped it to convert Palestine into a Zionist State. If such 
groups took power in key countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria I am sure that an 
era of open conflict between the Arab World and America will open for many years to 
come.  The US administration should learn from the 2006 Palestinian elections where 
Hamas emerged as the winner and the party that will form the next Palestinian 
government. President Bush declared that his administration will not deal with such 
government refusing the democratic results of the elections opening yet another 
accusation that America is not interested in real democracy to take place in any Arab 
country.   
What is required here is a new US policy to support a gradual transforming the Arab 
World into democracy, a policy of alliance between America and the Arab people to get 
red of oppression and to support for real steps  to be taken by Arab regimes for power 
sharing with the liberal forces.  
What the Arab World needs from the United States is a clear policy declaring that 
authoritarianism is not acceptable in the World in general and in Arab World in 
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particular, and to use all available means to replace it with democratic governments. It 
should press for a Security council resolution declaring authoritarianism and 
dictatorships as unlawful form of government that should be band or prohibited. 
What is required is a policy of alliance between the United States and the Arab 
people to replace the present US policy of protecting and supporting the same Arab 
regimes who oppress them.  
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